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HE Article 1 revision process began with a report from an Ameri-
can Bar Association Task Force to the Permanent Editorial Board
of the U.C.C. recommending certain substantive revisions to Arti-
cle 1. The Article 1 Committee was appointed in 1996.1 In addition to
considering substantive revisions to Article 1, the Committee also was
given the task of coordinating the revisions to other articles in order to
eliminate unintended differences in provisions and policies, a process that
came to be known as "harmonization." This Article briefly discusses the
Committee's work with regard to each of its roles. Part II describes the
revisions that have been made to Article 1. Part III discusses the Com-
mittee's harmonization efforts.
II. SUBSTANTIVE REVISIONS
Article 1, General Provisions, is different in kind from the other sub-
stantive articles of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). While the
other substantive articles provide rules to govern particular types of com-
mercial transactions, Article 1 provides rules that govern all transactions
covered by the UCC without regard to their nature. It contains general
rules of construction for interpreting the provisions of the entire Code,2
definitions applicable throughout the Code,3 a choice of law rule that ap-
plies to the other articles to the extent they do not contain their own
* National Conference Associate Reporter, Article 1 Drafting Committee; Associ-
ate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; Member, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Indiana Delegation; Member,
American Law Institute.
** Chair, Article 1 Drafting Committee; Life Member, National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, Ohio Delegation; Life Member, American Law Insti-
tute; Member, Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code.
1. The original members of the Article 1 Committee were Boris Auerbach, Chair;
Marian Benfield, Amelia H. Boss, Curtis Reitz, and Connie Ring. Neil Cohen was the
Reporter. Kathleen Patchel subsequently became a member of the Committee and was
added as National Conference Associate Reporter in connection with the Committee's
harmonization efforts. James J. White also subsequently became a member of the
Committee.
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102 (1995) (mandating liberal construction of the Code to fur-
ther its purposes and providing for variation by agreement); id. § 1-103 (supplementation
of the Code by other law); id. § 1-104 (construction against implicit repeal).
3. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (1995) (general definitions).
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provisions on choice of law,4 and a few substantive provisions applicable
throughout the entire Code.5 Its provisions are the coordinating mecha-
nism that holds the Code together, providing a level of commonality
across the various substantive Articles of the Code.
Because the provisions of Article 1 apply to the entire Code, the im-
pact of decisions regarding what provisions it includes is greater than that
for decisions regarding provisions in individual articles. Thus, the Article
1 Drafting Committee was confronted with a slightly different task from
other UCC drafting committees in deciding what revisions to Article 1
were appropriate. In addition to deciding whether proposed revisions
were appropriate rules as a matter of policy, the Article 1 Committee also
had to consider whether a proposed rule, however meritorious in its own
right, was one that could be applied in the same form across a number of
different categories of commercial transactions with consistently predict-
able results.
Further, as with other drafting committees dealing with revision of ex-
isting Code articles, the Article 1 Committee was sensitive to the need to
avoid changes to the language of Article 1 based on purely stylistic rea-
sons. Although existing Article 1 language may not always be elegant or
concise, it is familiar to both lawyers and judges and has acquired a cer-
tain patina through years of interpretation by the courts.
The need to include only provisions that the Committee was confident
could be applied consistently and without unforeseen mischief across
multiple articles, and the need to avoid unnecessary changes to the lan-
guage of current Article 1, meant that the Article 1 Drafting Committee
necessarily was conservative in its approach to revision. Although the
Committee considered a number of proposals for change, they ultimately
made very few substantive revisions. Proposed revisions that may have
been meritorious as a matter of policy sometimes were rejected because
the Committee did not feel they overcame the additional hurdle of being
appropriate for inclusion in the General Provisions Article of the Code,
either because the way in which they would apply to different types of
transactions under the Code was unclear or because no single uniform
version of the rule was appropriate, as the substance of the rule would
need to vary from Article to Article. Thus, for example, although the
Committee had no doubt about the intrinsic merits of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine, the Committee decided not to include an unconscionability
provision in revised Article 1 because the Committee felt they could not
predict with a reasonable degree of certainty how that doctrine would
operate in the context of a number of the substantive articles of the UCC.
Similarly, the Committee's general reluctance to change existing Arti-
cle 1 language for purely stylistic reasons resulted in relatively few stylis-
tic changes. In general, language was rewritten only where current
4. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1995) (choice of law).
5. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995) (duty of good faith); id. § 1-201(37) (rules as to
whether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest).
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wording had proven confusing, or where rephrasing was necessary to
make the language gender-neutral. The language of a number of sections
remains completely unchanged. The Committee did decide, however, to
make structural changes to Article 1 to conform its structure to that of
recently revised Articles and to make the Article in general more user-
friendly. The Article was reorganized into three parts. Part 1 contains
rules of interpretation applicable throughout the UCC. Part 2 contains
definitions and related provisions. Part 3 contains the choice-of-law rule
and substantive rules applicable throughout the Code. The most signifi-
cant substantive changes are discussed below.
A. REVISED SECTION 1-102-SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
The Revision adds an express scope provision to Article 1 to indicate
which transactions are governed by its rules. Current Article 1 does not
state the scope of its applicability, although implicitly its scope has always
been that it only governs transactions within the scope of other articles of
the UCC. Because the lack of an express scope provision occasionally
caused courts and commentators to express uncertainty about which
transactions are governed by its substantive rules, the Committee decided
to state affirmatively the scope of Article 1. Section 1-102 provides that
Article 1 "applies to a transaction to the extent that is governed by any
other article of the [Uniform Commercial Code]. ''6
B. REVISED SECTION 1-103-SUPPLEMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A second change in the Revision relates to Sections 1-102(1) and (2)
and 1-103 of current Article 1. Current Section 1-102 (1) and (2) contains
a rule of construction stating that the Code should be liberally construed
to promote its underlying purposes and policies and lists those fundamen-
tal underlying purposes and policies. Comment 1 to current Section 1-
102 elaborates on this rule of construction, explaining that the UCC
should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and
policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the
purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the
Act as a whole, and the application of the language should be con-
strued narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with
the purposes and policies involved. 7
Thus, when read in light of this comment, Section 1-102 states that the
meaning of UCC provisions is to be determined not only in light of the
purposes and policies underlying the entire UCC but also in light of the
purposes and policies of particular Code provisions.
Current Section 1-103 states the relationship of the Code to other law.
It provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions." 8 It
6. U.C.C. § 1-102 (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
7. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1995).
8. Id. § 1-103.
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thus states both a principle of supplementation by other law and preemp-
tion of other law: principles of law and equity continue to apply to trans-
actions governed by the UCC, but only to the extent that the provisions
of the UCC do not "displace" them.
The Revision combines the purposes and policies provisions of Section
1-102 and the supplemental principles of law provision of Section 1-103 in
Revised section 1-103 to reflect the interrelationship between these prin-
ciples of construction. Because the fundamental rule of Code interpreta-
tion stated in Section 1-102 is to read Code text in light of the underlying
purposes and policies of the Code and of the particular provisions under
consideration, it logically follows that the appropriate scope of supple-
mentation must be tied to those purposes and policies as well. In order to
determine whether a principle of law or equity has been "displaced" by a
particular provision of the Code, one must first determine the scope of
the Code provision. Comment 1 to Section 1-102 says that, in order to
determine a provision's scope, "the application of the language should be
construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the
purposes and policies involved." 9
Neither the pre-revision sections nor their comments, however, explic-
itly make this connection. Instead, the little guidance given by the com-
ments as to what is meant by other law being "displaced" by the Code
seems to create an inconsistency between the two sections. While Com-
ment 1 to current Section 1-102 states that Code provisions must be ap-
plied in light of their underlying purposes and policies, Comment 1 to
current Section 1-103 states that supplemental bodies of law continue to
apply "except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this Act."10 The
addition of the qualifier "explicitly" in the comment could be read to
suggest that other law is not displaced unless the text of the Code ex-
pressly says so. That reading, however, would create a rigid rule at odds
with Section 1-102's admonition that the Code should be interpreted in
light of its underlying purposes and policies, as well as with the principle
(also found in Comment 1 to Section 1-102) that the Code may be applied
by analogy." In order to effectuate the underlying purposes and policies
of the Code, the scope of displacement must extend to displacement by
the purposes and policies of Code provisions as well as by express dis-
placement in the text. Otherwise, other law could be applied to supplant
the Code's provisions rather than to supplement them by thwarting the
9. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1995).
10. U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (1995).
11. ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE $ 1.04[2], at 1-7 (1985) ("Demanding an explicit displacement of non-
Code principles is not consistent with construing the Code to effectuate its underlying poli-
cies or extending the Code through analogical development .... [ "T]he use of the word
'explicitly' in Comment 1 to Section 1-103 was employed ill-advisedly. The use of this term
is not supported by the text of Section 1-103, and is inconsistent with the text of Section 1-
102(1). The courts should thus disregard this part of the Comment as inconsistent with the
text of the statute.").
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purposes and policies those provisions reflect. 12
The Drafting Committee considered several reformulations of the text
of current Section 1-103 designed to better articulate the relationship be-
tween the purposive construction of the Code and the extent of permissi-
ble supplementation by other law. Ultimately, however, the Committee
decided that the problem could best be resolved, not by changing the
text, but by combining the relevant parts of the two sections and provid-
ing a new comment to give better guidance as to circumstances under
which other law is displaced. Comment 2 to revised Section 1-103 sets
out the basic principle that other law is displaced if that other law is in-
consistent with either the text or the underlying purposes and policies of
the relevant Code provisions.
Revised Comment 2 also discusses the separate issue of the relation-
ship of the Code to other statutes. It notes that when the "other law"
involved is not a principle of common law or equity, but another statute,
Section 1-103 may still be relevant, but other rules of statutory construc-
tion dealing specifically with the interrelationship between statutes come
into play as well, and may very well be controlling.
C. REVISED SECTION 1-201-DEFINITIONS
Revised Article 1 makes several changes to existing definitions, while
also adding several new definitions. In addition, two of the existing Arti-
cle 1 definitions have been deleted, as no longer necessary, and several
have been relocated and rewritten as substantive rules. These changes
are discussed in more detail below.
1. Changes to Existing Definitions
a. Section 1-201(22)-"Good Faith"
The most significant change in the definitional section is the addition of
an objective component to the definition of "good faith." Current Sec-
tion 1-201(19) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned. '13 Revised Section 1-201(22) adds an objective
element to the definition of "good faith," defining "good faith" as not
only honesty in fact, but also "the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing. ' 14 This change makes the Article 1 definition
consistent with the updated definitions of "good faith" that have been
12. See id. at 1-7:
It is particularly important that the courts refrain from turning to pre-Code
law reflexively, merely because they encounter initial linguistic difficulty in
applying the code text to the problem before them. The issue should initially
be stated in terms of whether the pre-Code doctrine has been expressly or
impliedly overturned by the Code, bearing in mind the purposive reading of
the Code invited by Section 1-102. If the pre-Code rule is inconsistent with
the policies that the drafters sought to effectuate, then it has been impliedly
displaced.
13. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1995).
14. U.C.C. § 1-201(22) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
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added in recent revisions to individual Code articles. With the exception
of Article 5,15 all of the recent revisions to the UCC have added an objec-
tive element to the definition of good faith. 16 Article 5 is expressly ex-
cluded from the Revised Article 1 definition. 17
b. Other Changes
Minor revisions were made to a number of definitions. The definition
of "bank" was revised to conform to the Article 4A definition of that
term by expressly including "a savings bank, savings and loan association,
credit union, and trust company."'1 8 The reference to and definition of
"airbill" were deleted from the definition of "bill of lading" as no longer
necessary. 19 "Default" was added to the list of items that can constitute
"fault." °20 The reference to securities was deleted from the definition of
"fungible," as Article 8 no longer uses "fungible" to describe securities,
and the definition was rewritten for clarity.2 ' The definition of "holder"
also was rewritten for clarity.22 A reference to bona fide disputes was
added to the definition of "insolvent," and the definition was rewritten
for clarity.23 The definition of "money" was revised to make it clear that
only a "currently authorized" medium of exchange is included.24 The
definitions of "organization" and "person" were rewritten to conform to
the standard NCCUSL definitions of these concepts.2 5 The definition of
"security interest" was rewritten to conform to the revisions made to that
definition in Revised Article 9, and, as discussed below, the portion of the
15. See U.C.C. § 5-102(7) (1995) (defining "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the con-
duct or transaction concerned").
16. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-103(a)(4), 4A-105(a)(6), 8-102(a)(10), 9-102(a)(43). Article 2 al-
ways has applied an objective standard of good faith with regard to merchants. Id. § 2-
103(1)(b) ("'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."). The Article 2
definition has been incorporated into Article 2A by reference. Id. § 2A-103(3). Articles 6
and 7 are the only articles that do not currently have their own definition of "good faith."
17. The subjective definition of "good faith" contained in Article 5 would apply to
Article 5 transactions even in the absence of the express exclusion in Revised Section 1-
102(22), of course, as Article 1 definitions are subject to definitions in other articles.
U.C.C. § 1-201(b) ( Tentative Draft Dec. 2000). The rationale for retaining a subjective
definition of "good faith" in Article 5 is explained in the comments to section 5-102. See
U.C.C. § 5-102 cmt. 3 (1995).
18. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(4) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(5) (Tentative Draft Dec.
2000). See U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(2) (1989).
19. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(6) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(7) (Tentative Draft Dec.
2000).
20. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(16) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(19) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2000).
21. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(17) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2000).
22. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(23) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2000).
23. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(25) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2000).
24. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(26) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2000).
25. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(28), (30) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(17), (29) (Tenta-
tive Draft 2000).
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definition dealing with whether a transaction creates a lease or a security
interest was moved to a separate substantive provision.26 The definition
of "send" was updated to include electronic transactions by adding the
"record" concept and was rewritten for clarity.27 In addition, the current
revision draft contains a placeholder for the definition of "conspicuous,"
pending revision of that definition in connection with the revision of Arti-
cle 2. Once the content of the Article 2 definition is determined, the Ar-
ticle 1 Committee will assess whether the Article 2 definition is
appropriate for general use throughout the UCC.
2. Deleted Definitions
The definitions of "honor" 28 and "telegram"29 have been deleted in
Revised Article 1. The definition of "honor" was deleted because a gen-
eral definition of the term is not needed. "Honor" is used only twice
outside of Article 530 and is defined in Article 5.31 Finally, the definition
of "telegram" was deleted as outmoded.
3. Definitions Moved to Substantive Provisions
Three provisions from the definitional section were moved to their own
sections to reflect their largely substantive content. The rules for distin-
guishing a true lease from a security interest were moved from the defini-
tion of "security interest" to new Section 1-203.32 The definitions of
"notice" and "knowledge," and the cluster of related definitions and rules
found in pre-revision Sections 1-201(25)-(27), were moved to revised Sec-
tion 1-202. 33 The definition of "value" was moved to revised Section 1-
204.34 Although the rules contained in these three former definitional
sections were rewritten for clarity, no substantive changes were made.
4. New Definitions
Four new definitions have been added: "authenticate," "consumer,"
"record," and "state." Definitions of "authenticate '35 and "record" 36
were added to reflect the adoption of those terms in recent UCC revi-
sions as a means of providing medium neutrality. The precise wording of
26. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995) with U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(38), 1-203 (Tentative
Draft Dec. 2000).
27. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(38) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(39) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2000).
28. U.C.C. § 1-201(21) (1995).
29. Id. § 1-201(41).
30. See U.C.C. §§ 2-503(4)(b), 2-512 (1995).
31. See U.C.C. § 5-102(8) (1995).
32. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-203 (Tentative Draft Dec.
2000).
33. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(25)-(27) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-202 (Tentative Draft Dec.
2000).
34. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-204 (Tentative Draft Dec.
2000).
35. U.C.C. § 1-201(4) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
36. U.C.C. § 1-201(34) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
2001]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the definition of "authenticate," however, has been deferred until com-
pletion of the Article 2 revision. The definition of "consumer" was added
in light of that concept's growing importance in the Code. At the time
the UCC was originally drafted there were very few distinctions in the
Code's rules based on consumer status. The Committee determined that
recent revisions, including the Article 1 revision of its choice-of-law rules,
have made the "consumer" distinction a sufficiently important concept in
the Code to warrant a definition. The Committee adopted the traditional
definition of "consumer" used by the courts and in other statutes: 37 "an
individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family or
household purposes."'38 Finally, the standard NCCUSL definition of
"state" was added.39
In addition to these four entirely new definitions, a definition of "pre-
sent value," based on the definition of that term in the current definition
of "security interest," was added.40 Placeholders also remain in the cur-
rent draft's definitional section for new definitions of "electronic agent"
and "electronic message" pending the decision as to whether these terms
will be used in Articles 2 and 2A.
D. REVISED SECTION 1-303-CoURSE OF PERFORMANCE, COURSE OF
DEALING, AND USAGE OF TRADE
Although the comments to pre-revision Section 1-205 refer to course of
performance,41 the section itself deals with only course of dealing and
usage of trade. The Revision remedies this omission by adding course of
performance to course of dealing and usage of trade as relevant in ascer-
taining the meaning of the parties' agreement and supplementing its ex-
press terms.42 This change was among those recommended by the ABA
Article One Task Force in its Study Report. The Article 1 course-of-per-
formance rules are based on those currently found in Articles 2 and 2A.43
E. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The statute of frauds found in pre-revision Section 1-206 was deleted in
the Revision. The Committee determined that this provision was unnec-
essary for transactions within the UCC and inappropriate for transactions
outside the UCC. An Article 1 statute of frauds is unnecessary for trans-
actions within the UCC because other articles of the Code make their
own individual determinations as to the extent to which writings will be
37. Cf., e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109 (1995); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(23) (1999) (definition of "con-
sumer goods").
38. U.C.C. § 1-201(11)(a) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
39. U.C.C. § 1-201(41) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
40. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(z) (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-201(30) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2000).
41. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 2 (1995).
42. Compare U.C.C. § 1-205 (1995) with U.C.C. § 1-303 (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
43. See U.C.C. § 2-208 (1995); id. § 2A-207 (1987).
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required in transactions within their scope.44 This means that the Section
1-206 statute of frauds can only apply to transactions outside of the UCC.
That application is inconsistent with the scope of Article 1, now expressly
stated as limited to transactions within other articles of the Code.45
F. REVISED SECTION 1-301-CHOICE OF LAW
The most significant change to Article 1 made by the Revision was the
complete rewrite of the Article 1 choice-of-law rules. The Committee's
work on Section 1-301 occupied more of its time than any other of the
revisions and attracted by far the most attention and comment. Section
1-301 is a significant rethinking of the choice-of-law issues addressed in
pre-revision Section 1-105, both with regard to the power of the parties to
select the applicable law by contract and with regard to the law applicable
in the absence of contract. A brief summary of the changes made by
Section 1-301 follows.
1. Choice of Law by Contract
Current Section 1-105 authorizes parties to choose the law that will
apply by contract but limits their ability to choose in two ways. First, the
parties may make a contractual choice of law only "when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or na-
tion."'46 Thus, the right of the parties to choose the governing law is lim-
ited to multi-state and international transactions. 47 Second, the parties
are limited in their choices to the law of one of the jurisdictions that bears
a reasonable relation to the transaction. 48 These same rules apply to both
commercial and consumer transactions.
Section 1-301 distinguishes between commercial and consumer transac-
tions, retaining the reasonable-relationship limits only for consumer
transactions. 49 Section 1-301 further provides that, in consumer transac-
tions, the law otherwise chosen, whether by the parties or by the court in
44. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995) (Article 2 statute of frauds); id. § 2A-201 (1987)
(Article 2A statute of frauds); id. § 3-103(6), (9) (defining orders and promises as "written"
instruments).
45. U.C.C. § 1-102 (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000). Section 1-206 also has the distinction
of being one of the two provisions in current Article 1 not exempt from the federal Elec-
tronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-SIGN"), enacted on June 30,
2000, which provides that "a signature, contract or other record relating to [a transaction in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce] may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form." 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)(1) (2000). The
other Article 1 Section subject to E-SIGN is Section 1-107 (requiring a written waiver or
renunciation signed by the aggrieved party to discharge a claim or right arising out of an
alleged breach). 15 U.S.C. § 7003(a)(3) (2000). Revised Section 1-306, which replaces Sec-
tion 1-107, conforms that section to E-SIGN by allowing discharge of a claim or right "by
agreement of the aggrieved party in an authenticated record." U.C.C. § 1-306 (Tentative
Draft Dec. 2000).
46. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1995).
47. Id. cmt. 1.
48. Id. §§ 1-105(1), 1-105 cmt. 1
49. U.C.C. § 1-301(d)(1) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000). A consumer transaction is one
in which one of the parties to the transaction is a consumer. Id. § 1-301(d). A "consumer"
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the absence of effective choice, may not deprive the consumer of protec-
tive rules of law of the consumer's habitual residence that may not be
varied by agreement.50 The one exception to this rule is that, in the case
of a sale of goods, when all of the relevant events-all the significant
steps in making the contract and the delivery of the goods-take place in
a jurisdiction other than that of the consumer's habitual residence, then
the non-variable protective rules of that jurisdiction apply instead of
those of the consumer's habitual residence.51
In nonconsumer transactions, Section 1-301 broadens the ability of the
parties to choose law by agreement. In domestic transactions, both of the
limits of pre-revision Section 1-105 were eliminated: the parties can
choose applicable law by contract although their transaction has a rela-
tionship to only one state, and the law chosen does not have to be of a
state that bears any relation to the transaction.52 Before the parties can
choose the law of a foreign country by contract, however, their transac-
tion must bear a reasonable relation to a country other than the United
States. 53 As long as this requirement is met, the law chosen by the parties
in an international transaction need not be of a state or country that has
any relation to the transaction. 54
2. Applicable Law in the Absence of Effective Contractual Choice
Pre-revision Section 1-105 provides that if the parties do not choose the
applicable law by agreement, then the UCC of the forum state applies to
transactions that bear "an appropriate relation" to the forum. 55 This rule
is in essence a forum-favoring provision, designed to insure maximum ap-
plication of the UCC at a time when it was unclear how widespread its
enactment might be.
Revised Section 1-301 abandons this special "appropriate relation" test
in favor of application of the forum state's general choice of law rules.
Section 1-301(c) provides that, in the absence of an effective agreement
of the parties, "the rights and obligations of the parties are determined
... by the law that would be selected by application of this State's conflict
of laws principles. '56 Review of UCC choice-of-law cases revealed that
in practice a significant number of courts were ignoring the "appropriate
relation" test in favor of application of their general choice of law rules
anyway. The Committee's adoption of the Revision rule thus is in part
based on a recognition of this realty. The revised rule also reflects the
is "an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes." Id. § 1-201(b)(11)(a).
50. Id. § 1-301(d)(2)(A).
51. Id. § 1-301(d)(2)(B).
52. Id. § 1-301(b)(1).
53. Id. § 1-301(a)(2).
54. U.C.C. § 1-301(b)(2) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
55. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1995).
56. U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2000).
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now well-established status of the UCC, which no longer requires a fo-
rum-favoring rule in order to enhance the likelihood of its application.
3. Other Rules
In addition to the rules discussed above, revised Section 1-301 contains
several principles that have no counterpart in pre-revision Section 1-105.
First, because current Article 1 does not contain an express scope provi-
sion, the scope of the choice-of-law rules in Section 1-105 is not entirely
clear. As discussed above, revised Section 1-102 expressly states that Ar-
ticle 1 applies to a transaction to the extent it is governed by one of the
substantive articles of the UCC. In the choice of law context, application
of this scope provision means that the rules of Section 1-301 apply to a
transaction to the extent it is governed by the UCC. Second, unlike pre-
revision Section 1-105, revised Section 1-301 and its comments address
the effect of fundamental policy on choice of law. Section 1-301(e) places
a fundamental policy limit on the parties' contractual choice of law, pro-
viding that their choice is not effective to the extent application of the
chosen law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction
whose law would govern in the absence of agreement. Third, the com-
ments to revised Section 1-301 state that the traditional principle pursu-
ant to which a forum may refuse to apply the law selected by the parties
when application of that law would be contrary to a fundamental policy
of the forum may cause a court to refuse to enforce a contractual choice-
of-law provision, although the choice of law is not contrary to a funda-
mental policy of the state whose law would otherwise apply. Finally, the
comments indicate that issues relating to the basic validity of a choice-of-
law agreement are left to other law.
III. HARMONIZATION
Most of the UCC has undergone revision during the past decade. In
addition to revising Article 1, the Article 1 Committee was given the task
of monitoring the ongoing revisions of other Articles to avoid unneces-
sary differences in language and policies among the various Articles. The
Committee was asked to identify differences in substance, organization,
and language among the Articles and to facilitate the minimization of
these differences through meetings with the Chairs and Reporters of the
various drafting committees.
The coordination efforts of the Article 1 Committee focused primarily
on the revisions to Articles 2, 2A, and the proposed new Article 2B. The
subject matter of these three articles-sales, leasing, and licensing, re-
spectively-although sufficiently distinct to require separate bodies of
rules, also encompasses many common issues. Further, both Article 2A
and Article 2B had used the rules of Article 2 as a base from which to
develop their own rules. Thus, it was reasonable to expect that these Ar-
ticles would deal with similar issues in a similar manner, except to the
extent that the substantive differences were justified by differences in the
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nature of the transactions covered by the three Articles, their scope, the
development of the law with respect to them, or the need to reflect differ-
ing industry practices. In addition, to the extent Article 2A and proposed
Article 2B had borrowed Article 2 provisions, it was considered advisable
that the wording of these identical provisions be identical as well. Thus,
the harmonization project had both a substantive and a nonsubstantive
aspect. It was designed to coordinate both the substance of the drafts of
these articles to make sure that differences in the rules were based on
transactional differences and to coordinate the language of similar
provisions.
The Article 1 Committee, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), and the American Law Institute
(ALI) devoted considerable resources to the harmonization project. The
Article 1 Committee as a whole spent several drafting committee meet-
ings identifying substantive and textual differences among Articles 2, 2A,
and 2B and meeting with the Chairs and Reporters of those committees
to resolve the differences identified. The Article 1 Chair, Reporter, and
Associate Reporter held a number of other coordination discussions and
meetings with the Chairs and Reporters of the Articles. In addition, NC-
CUSL devoted a session at its July 1997 Annual Meeting to presentation
of some of the more important substantive differences among the three
articles to obtain the advice of the NCCUSL membership. After the de-
cision to convert the proposed Article 2B from a part of the UCC into a
uniform law, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), the coordination efforts continued in a more limited fashion
among the policies of UCITA and Articles 2 and 2A. The final harmoni-
zation meeting also included the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA) in the coordination effort.
Throughout its harmonization efforts, the Article 1 Committee was
hampered by the fact that it was dealing with not one, but three, con-
stantly moving targets. Both the substance and the text of each of the
three Articles was constantly changing, based on decisions of the individ-
ual drafting committees as each of the separate drafting efforts
progressed. Further, the Committee had to deal with a certain amount of
natural resistance on the part of the various Chairs and Reporters, and
their committees, to alteration of language and decisions made in the in-
dividual committees in order to achieve the broader goal of consistency
across the Articles. Nevertheless, while the harmonization process did
not achieve complete consistency among the various revisions, there was
a considerably higher degree of coordination among both policies and
language after the process than had existed before it began. Perhaps of
equal importance, the Article 1 Committee's harmonization efforts
served to sensitize the entities involved in the uniform laws process to the
importance of coordination of efforts by various drafting committees.
Such coordination efforts are likely to be viewed as an important element
in future revision processes.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Revised Article 1 was approved by the Council of the American Law
Institute in December 2000, and will be presented to the membership of
the ALI for final approval at the ALI Annual Meeting in May 2001. It
will then be presented for final approval by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at NCCUSL's Annual Meeting in
August 2001. Although in terms of sheer number of changes Revised Ar-
ticle 1 is not a major revision, the improvements made to Article 1 by the
revision clarify and update the general provisions of the UCC in ways
designed to improve significantly the UCC's continuing effectiveness as
the primary statute governing commercial transactions. Further, the Ar-
ticle 1 Committee's harmonization efforts not only improved the coordi-
nation of language and policy among the UCC Articles and related
statutes that were the subject of that process but also began a tradition of
coordination among related drafting efforts that is likely to continue to
the benefit of future revision projects.
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